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Mister: The Drama of Black Manhood in 
Faulkner and Morrison
Philip M. Weinstein
I wish to begin at what appears to be a certain distance from my 
topic—“Mister”—by reflecting on what it means to come back 
to this conference, for the fifth time to be standing on this 
podium. No one does it for the money, and the weather in 
August can be downright uncomfortable. Nevertheless, when I 
arrive, usually a few days before my talk, I find myself helplessly 
acting out a Faulknerian scenario. Deep in Go Down, Moses, I 
am on the threshold of yet another hunt—male and female this 
time—wondering who’s going to be here, how many familiar 
faces, how many new ones, whether this will be the year we 
catch him once and for all. And I say to myself what a laconic 
Sam Fathers says to the eager Ike McCaslin: “We aint got the 
dog yet.”^
“We aint got the dog yet”: this won’t be the year we catch up 
with, gain possession over, the writer who is both our beloved 
and our prey. He’ll escape once again. However indelibly this 
year’s talks may (or may not) capture Faulkner’s meanings, he’ll 
elude our chase; we’ll regroup next summer and begin again. 
Indeed, what would it mean to capture him? Could we ever 
have the dog that secures a final grasp upon our desired object? 
Would we want this even if we could achieve it?
We continue to participate in the Go Down, Moses hunt, 
seeking less to capture him than to invoke him, wanting this 
event in time—a week in August—to partake as well in some­
thing that has happened often enough to seem timeless: “the 
old bear absolved of mortality and himself who shared a little of
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it” {GDM 195). As with a love affair, it may be the radiance of 
encounter rather than penetration or possession that we re after. 
Our entries into the beloved’s textual body leave him fabulously 
unmarked: “forever wilt thou love and she be fair.”
In his name we foregather, and there would be no pursuit if 
he were not its object, yet this ritual is as much about the 
hunters as the hunted. He is the unifying occasion in whose 
name we play out “the best game of all, the best of all breathing 
and forever the best of all listening, the voices quiet and weighty 
and deliberate for retrospection and recollection and exactitude.
. . . There was always a bottle present” {GDM 184). “We aint 
got the dog yet. ” We don’t want the dog; we would refuse him 
if we had him. We come for refreshment (in its several senses), 
we come to encounter rather than to penetrate: a good hunt is 
one that makes us look forward to the next one next year. The 
name for this activity, for why I’ve been coming to Oxford in 
August since 1985, is not possession but identification.
The boundedness of possession (of self and of the other) 
versus the fluidity of identification (of self with the other): 
between these two extremes we may begin to conceptualize a 
more flexible poetics of identity. At the one extreme, identity— 
one’s own, that of others—is imagined as a possessible property. 
At the other extreme it is an aleatory, interpenetrable, and 
frighteningly vulnerable resource. The one is solid, with the 
strengths and weaknesses that attach to solidity. The other is 
liquid, with the strengths and weaknesses that attach to liquid­
ity. Treating them both as psychological propensities, Freud 
distinguishes possession and identification as the desire to have 
the other versus the desire to be the other. Though he also 
stresses that “identification ... is ambivalent from the very 
first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into 
a wish for someone’s removal,” he makes it clear that possession 
accesses the other as object while identification seeks (impossi­
bly) to access the other as subject.^ These opening remarks, I 
hope, no longer seem so distant from my topic, for the terms of 
possession and identification not only describe our commerce
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with Faulkner and each other, but also take me to “Mister: The 
Drama of Black Manhood in Faulkner and Morrison.”
♦ * *
Years after the [Civil] war white Southerners sighed with 
relief when Booker T. Washington received a doctorate.
They had too much respect for him to call him “Booker” 
and could not call any black man “Mr.”; but “Dr. Washing­
ton” presented no problem.
—Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, fordan. Roll:
The World the Slaves Made
Mister: the term articulates two specific moments of racial/ 
gender crisis in Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses and Morrison’s 
Beloved. More broadly, it puts before us, as in this early 
twentieth-century white dilemma over how to address Booker 
T. Washington, a host of racial/gender norms. Descended from 
“master,” Mister performs as an address of respect. Whatever 
ironic inflections it may take on notwithstanding, the term 
acknowledges a sustained distance between self and other, a 
minimal space surrounding the male designated Mister that 
keeps him, so to speak, intact within a field of address. Children 
are not yet Misters, not yet inserted into the social network 
securely enough to receive this deference. Thus Mr. both 
betokens male adulthood as achieved insertion within the sym­
bolic order—one can only be Mr. within a larger community 
of Misters—and simultaneously declares a certain measure of 
autonomy. To be addressed as Mr. is to be addressed properly, 
with propriety, with the implication of property. All three of 
these notions—^property, propriety, the proper—are inter­
twined components of the mastery that stands behind Mister, 
and they point to those aspects of manhood reserved for the 
white Master, denied explicitly to the black male slave and 
implicitly to the black freedman.^
Mister may further imply, I want to argue, a completed 
negotiation of the Oedipal crisis itself All Misters are deemed 
to have passed through the crucible of potentially crippling 
infantile confusions and to be credentialed as fully individuated
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human beings within the social order. They have internalized 
the father’s authority (in the form of the superego), become 
capable of policing themselves, achieved adult identity. Proper­
tied or not. Misters are assumed to be self-owning and entitled 
to larger ownership; fathers or not, they may occupy paternal 
terrain.^ The refusal of Southern white culture to call Booker T. 
Washington “Mr.” is a refusal to grant him manhood within that 
culture’s registers of property, propriety, and the proper: the 
potential property of goods and land that define the birthright of 
white post-Enlightenment males, the propriety of membership 
within a community of white Misters, and the proper (the 
propre, “one’s own”) of achieved masculinity itself. These are 
the larger stakes at issue in the drama of black manhood.
* * *
Property, propriety, the proper: perhaps the greatest of these is 
property. Before moving forward to the specific resonance of 
these terms in Faulkner’s and Morrison’s texts, I want briefly to 
rehearse the larger American claim for property as a defining 
attribute of free men. That claim, of course, derives from the 
European Enlightenment; its best-known source is probably 
John Locke’s “Second Essay Concerning Civil Government” 
(1690).® Seeking (in the wake of a century of religious war) to 
shore up England’s 1688 bloodless revolution, proposing an 
argument of natural law that would supersede any monarchical 
constraint upon the subject, Locke writes: “The natural liberty 
of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not 
to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have 
only the law of Nature for his rule” (283). Deeper than any 
covenant imposed by church or king, Locke argues, is our 
natural, inalienable liberty. This liberty acquires focus and 
grounding through the concept of property: “Though the earth, 
and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man 
has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to 
but himself The labour of his body and the work of his hands, 
we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes 
out of the state that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
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mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his property” (287-88). Given these 
convictions, Locke has no difficulty in assigning to government 
its foremost purpose: “The great and chief end, therefore, of 
men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves 
under government, is the preservation of their property
(350-51)-
It would be hard to overestimate the appeal of this argument 
to our Founding Fathers. Louis Hartz, seeking to characterize 
this country’s liberal tradition, calls Locke “America’s philoso­
pher” as he could never have been Europe’s: “When Locke 
came to America ... a change appeared. Because the basic 
feudal oppressions of Europe had not taken root, the fundamen­
tal social norm of Locke ceased in large part to look like a norm 
and began, of all things, to look like a sober description of fact.
. . . History was on a lark, out to tease men, not by shattering 
their dreams, but by fulfilling them with a sort of satiric accu­
racy.”® Our labor, the activation of our own personal resources, 
the goods we individually gather through such expenditure of 
energy: these are to be thought of (with a literalism inconceiv­
able in the Old World) as our inalienable property, central to 
our unfettered identity. British refusal to recognize—through 
appropriate representation—this American right to property led 
to a justified war of independence. The individual possession of 
property is not only what we will go to war to protect, it is also 
what most securely keeps the peace. “Government, thought the 
Fathers, is based on property,” Richard Hofstadter writes. 
“Men who have no property lack the necessary stake in an 
orderly society to make stable or reliable citizens.”^ Noah 
Webster extends this view in a 1787 commentary on the Consti­
tution, seeing in the maintenance of property rights the very 
basis of freedom:
Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this truth, that property is the
basis of power; and this, being established as a cardinal point,
directs us to the means of preserving our freedom. Make laws,
irrevocable laws in every state, destroying and barring entailments;
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leave real estates to revolve from hand to hand, as time and accident 
may direct; and no family influence can be acquired and established 
for a series of generations—no man can obtain dominion over a 
large territory—the laborious and saving, who are generally the 
best citizens, will possess each his share of property and power, and 
thus the balance of wealth and power will continue where it is, in 
the body of the people. A general and tolerably equal distribution 
of landed property is the whole basis of national freedom
If property is proposed as the grounding concept of both 
peace and freedom, we might begin to note the anxieties and 
omissions that hedge this claim even in Locke and Webster, 
and that have bedevilled it ever since.® Suppose that each did 
not possess his share, that property were not spread through 
the body of the people . . . [with] tolerably equal distribution,” 
that one man did take more than he could actually make use of? 
Suppose he did obtain “dominion over a large territory”? Locke 
feebly argues that “He was only to look that he used them [the 
goods that make up his property] before they spoiled, else he 
took more than his share, and robbed others. And, indeed, it 
was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than 
he could make use of” (300). But this rejoinder had no more 
force in 1690 than the following one penned 245 years later and 
put into the mind of young Thomas Sutpen: “and as for objects, 
nobody had any more of them than you did because everybody 
had just what he was strong enough or energetic enough to take 
and keep, and only that crazy man would go to the trouble to 
take or even want more than he could eat or swap for powder 
and whiskey.
But somebody always does have more than you do, and 
Sutpen stumbles down from the mountain upon a Tidewater 
drama that sharply subverts Locke: the spectacle of a white man 
so engorged with property that his power is revealed not in his 
labor—Locke’s crucial justificatory term—but in his indolence: 
a man whom others fan and feed, who lords it over “a country 
all divided and fixed and neat with a people living on it all 
divided and fixed and neat because of what color their skins
The Drama of Black Manhood 279
happened to be and what they happened to own” (AA 179). 
Here the defects of the property schema leap into visibility. Far 
from a natural right of every human being, it is always selec­
tively distributed, first to industrious white males who under­
wrote England’s bloodless revolution of 1688 and our bloody 
one of 1776, thereafter to white males (even those originating 
from the Old Bailey) cunning or hungry enough to acquire it. 
Propertied white men not only may grow greedy for more 
property, but there are other, gaping omissions on the American 
scene: poor whites who lack property; women who both lack 
property and are property; slaves who are nothing but property; 
their offspring still in search of property. History only seemed 
to be on a lark, for what beckoned as a manageable fact—the 
effective accumulation of property—^would for many Americans 
never be more than a dream. Founded on a premise destined 
to implode from within—to make of class, gender, and race the 
very factors that will cause the dream of identity-as-property to 
collapse—^American culture comes into being, it seems, as a 
white male drama with its tragic exclusions already inseparable 
from its intoxicating promises. Faulkner and Morrison were 
conceived centuries before they were bom. Before turning 
specifically to Lucas Beauchamp and Paul D, I would like 
briefly to probe the larger “repercussion” of property and self­
ownership in both writers.
* * 4c
Faulkner becomes Faulkner, paradoxically, by finding his way 
into the drama of radically failed self-ownership. The voices of 
Benjy and Quentin Compson testify eloquently to the collapse 
of the American dream of identity-as-property. Rather than the 
Lockean premise of successful labor, of a thmsting male will 
that subdues and shapes an estate in its ovm image—that knows 
itself through what it possesses—Faulkner gives us the drama 
of interior dispossession. Caught up within a stream-of-con- 
sciousness technique that produces them not as subjects with a 
coherent project but as cacophonous sites of cultural interfer­
ence, Benjy and Quentin never do or own anything. Instead,
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they are done to, they suffer the consequences of previous 
cultural designs gone awry: the burden of generations of Comp- 
son dysfunction comes to rest upon their ineffectual minds and 
bodies. “I was trying to say” is the hallmark of Faulknerian 
voice, and it can find utterance only when a culture’s known 
forms of saying—of articulating social possibility as an achievable 
personal project—have failed. Early Faulknerian voice is an 
unforgettable way of saying No after a host of conventional ways 
of saying Yes have proved bankrupt. “
Benjy, Quentin, Dari, Joe Christmas: these are the subjectivi­
ties the early Faulkner most brilliantly produced; each signals 
the unavailingness of cultural designs as maps for achievable 
selfhood. If in Western culture the Oedipal crisis is the ordeal 
the male child must go through in order to emerge as a 
candidate for paternity and its perquisites—property, propriety, 
the proper—then each of these figures remains arrested on the 
threshold of that journey, dancing around a wound that precedes 
the Oedipal. Damaged by defective or disappeared mothers, 
insufficiently birthed into the culture’s symbolic orders (or 
birthed into the culture’s insufficient symbolic orders), they 
cannot manage the simplest tasks of self-ownership. Insecurely 
gendered, incapable of separating internal from external, reso­
lutely untrainable, these boychildren careen across the Faulk­
nerian canvas, revealing fissure and contradiction wherever they 
touch down. Desiring their mother or their sister or their 
brother, they are hopelessly enmeshed in incest schemas, and 
such schemas only deepen as scandal if the sibling turns out to 
be black as well. Indeed, Faulkner found his way into the ordeal 
of race through the ordeal of family, and in a certain sense he 
never ceased to view racial torment as an epiphenomenon of 
family torment. Incest and miscegenation are the prime motives 
fueling his narrative, guaranteeing its subversion of Lockean 
proprieties by contaminating all definitions of the proper. If 
there is one thing his most memorable characters share, it is the 
knowledge that they do not possess themselves. Is it too much 
to say that a fear of contamination—an all but hysterical sensitiv-
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ity to odors and touches that have already invaded and deformed 
before they are even recorded by consciousness—coils at the 
core of Faulknerian sensibility? Or should we say that this 
fear of contamination registers simultaneously an impossible 
(because ideologically taboo) longing—a desire to cross illicit 
boundaries (incestuous, miscegenous) in which successful trans­
gression could only mean the death of the proper subject? At 
any rate, from Donald Mahan to the reporter in Pylon to Chick 
Mallison, a characteristic male note is to be moved beyond 
control, overwhelmed: hardly traits on which a fiction commit­
ted to the masculine pursuit of identity through attainment of 
fixed property could be built.
Even if we grant that Faulkner’s work is invested in such a 
critique of identity-as-property, we might also concede his 
work’s yearning for achieved selfhood, attained project, the 
successful maturation of child into property-bearing adult. Go 
Down, Moses manages in its portrait of Ike McCaslin to attend 
with equal generosity to why he must repudiate and what social 
price he pays in repudiating. Who better than Faulkner could 
understand a refusal to take on the guilt attaching to propertied 
Southern adulthood, even as he shows both that property 
repudiated remains property someone else will accept and 
abuse, and that the undeviating pursuit of property could be an 
epic male undertaking, however disastrous its eonsequences?
As for Morrison, her texts likewise reeognize that while 
identity as self-contained property might foreclose one’s emo­
tional resources, on the one hand—think of Macon Dead Jr. in 
Song of Solomon—identity as unchecked identification threat­
ens to run rampant over the fragile boundaries of one’s selfhood, 
on the other. No one who has imagined the damage done to 
individual identity by the institution of slavery—the attack on 
sustaining psychic boundaries, the undoing of one s own self- 
possession—^will discount the power of the freed Baby Suggs’s 
discovery: “But suddenly she saw her hands and thought with a 
clarity as simple as it was dazzling, ‘These hands belong to me. 
These my hands.’ Hers to own, to make plans for, take
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charge of; the text’s most lyrical passage rehearses Baby Suggs’s 
sermon of self-ownership, of reclaiming your body from the 
institution that had controlled it. “Claim” is a term that punctu­
ates Morrison’s text: “Freeing yourself was one thing; claiming 
ownership of that freed self was another” (B 95). The radically 
unclaimed self—unable to count on its free labor as its own 
property—is rudderless, a creature of others’ will, what Locke 
quite deliberately calls a slave.
Beloved both endorses and provocatively calls into question 
this model of achieved self-ownership—calls it into question not 
least because no people who had experienced three centuries of 
enslavement could afford to envisage their subjectivity in such 
immaculate terms of self-management. If you had to own your­
self to be yourself, and if this model could actually be realized 
only for a certain class of white males, then what goes on inside 
the mind and heart of all those others—unpropertied white 
males, women, slaves—^for whom such a definition of who they 
are is only a mockery of what they are? This is exactly the 
question I want now to pursue, more deliberately, through 
Faulkner’s and Morrison’s black males. Unable to be a Mister, 
how does an unpropertied black male negotiate his manhood? I 
turn to Lucas Beauchamp in a scene from “The Fire and the 
Hearth” in Go Down, Moses.
“Are you the husband?” the Chancellor said.
“That’s right,” Lucas said.
“Say sir to the court!” the clerk said. Lucas glanced at the clerk.
“What?” he said. “I dont want no court. I done changed my—”
“Why you uppity—” the clerk began. . . .
“Not now,” Lucas said. “We don’t want no voce. Roth Edmonds 
knows what I mean.”
“What? Who does?”
“Why, the uppity—” the clerk said. “Your Honor—” Again the 
Chancellor raised his hand slightly toward the clerk. He still looked 
at Lucas.
“Mister Roth Edmonds,” Lucas said . . . (GDM 124)
Are you the husband? ” The question resonates in the mind, 
inasmuch as the deepest crisis Lucas Beauchamp undergoes in
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this novel revolves around his status as Molly s husband. If he 
were Molly’s husband as a white man is husband of a white 
woman, Zack would never have presumed upon Molly as his 
own property (a presumption the text produces as normative 
more than as transgressive). And Lucas would never have 
needed to wonder, *How to God . . . can a black man ask a 
white man to please not lay down with his black wife?’ ” (GDM 
58) “Please”: the word betokens not personal timidity but a 
structured nonmastery, a pleading with the master to abrogate 
a right that is his in some way deeper than the law itself Of 
course it was until 1865 the law itself: during slavery there were 
no legal black marriages. Despite the overwhelming reliance 
of black families upon this ceremony, it was for obvious reasons 
illegal: in the eyes of the law the offspring of slaves belong to 
the white master. “Are you the husband?” Earlier in the South 
he would not have been, and Faulkner saturates this 1940s 
court scene with Lucas’s continued eccentricity to legal norms. 
We have here a Chancellor, a clerk, a Mister—and Lucas. Each 
of these white titles conveys entitlement within the social 
system, and the scandal Faulkner delights in is Lucas s never­
theless insisting on agency. Pressured as to juridical identity, 
menaced as to courtroom manners, Lucas insinuates his own 
purpose into the scene: Roth Edmonds knows what I mean,
and Roth does. The price Lucas pays registers not in his 
checkbook—Edmonds pays court costs—^but in that required 
term of respect he must utter yet can never himself receive 
from the lips of white men: “Mister.”
Faulkner dramatizes Lucas’s pursuit of an independent iden­
tity as an ongoing struggle with the white Symbolic implicit in 
“Mister.” His origin, announced in “The Bear” as already white- 
bestowed, “ledgered,” is what he seeks to rewrite:
not Lucius Quintus @c @c @c, but Lucas Quintus, not refusing to 
be called Lucius, because he simply eliminated that word from the 
name; not denying, declining the name itself, because he used 
three quarters of it; but simply taking the name and changing, 
altering it, making it no longer the white man’s but his own, by
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himself composed, himself selfprogenitive and nominate, by himself 
ancestored . . . (GDM 269)
We should note the desperate illogic of this premise: how ean a 
man ehange his name from inherited Lueius to invented Lucas 
and be imagined as therefore free, self-progenitive, and nomi­
nate? The old man, the original Lucius Quintus Carothers 
McCaslin, dominates Lucas’s psychic life; all alterations relate 
to this white origin. But Lucas strives to relate to it on equal 
terms—Lucas to Lucius—whereas Isaac’s very name places him 
in a structure of Biblical sonship, his moves limited to support 
of or withdrawal from the parental narrative.
Lucas, by contrast, would step into the entitlements of that 
narrative; this requires, however, taking on its originary white 
male terms. Put starkly, Faulkner redresses Lucas’s race and 
gender marginality—his lack of entitlement, of land, of secured 
wife—not by immersing him within the living resources of a 
native black culture, but by phantasmatically aligning him with 
the authority of his white male soul-mates. Locked in an em­
brace that harbors this text’s deepest yearning, Lucas is drama­
tized in unforgettable encounter with Zack across the marriage 
bed and with Old Carothers over the upholding of masculine 
honor, just as in Intruder in the Dust he will be dramatized in 
charged relation to Chick, his childlike suitor, and to Gavin, his 
garrulous and frustrated brother. White to black, male to male, 
each of these pairings figures the bond that Faulkner has 
invested in, and each represses from view its excluded other: 
black to black, male to female. “Are you the husband?” is the 
surface question—are you capable of enforcing your claim to 
your wife?—but the underlying question is different: “Are you 
the man?”—can you hold your own with Old Carothers?
Thus when Lucas makes his way through Zack’s challenge to 
his manhood by a ritual encounter of honor-bound moves, 
advantages offered first by one and then by the other and 
accepted by neither, the enemy cherished even as he is pursued 
(all of this enacted over the wife-empty bridal bed)—^when
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Lucas terminates this love scene to his own satisfaction, he 
thinks: “Old Carothers . . .1 needed him and he come and spoke 
for me" {GDM 57). This suturing moment locates Lucas’s self- 
possession within the fantasy of a white male structure of 
subjectivity. He becomes himself by being spoken/spoken for 
by Old Carothers. Defiantly risking his ovm life and Zack’s, 
Lucas answers—as no one else in Go Down, Moses does an­
swer—the old man’s original challenge. That challenge was 
shaped, precisely, by the American property-model: simply to 
take all you wanted and could get, to bend your will to no man s 
rejoinder, to map the world and name its creatures as though 
you were indeed your own ancestor and all others your progeny 
or property. Go Down, Moses eloquently testifies to the inhu­
manity of this project, but perhaps we have overlooked the 
text’s covert longing for it nevertheless. Old Carothers, Du 
Homme, Sam Fathers, Old Ben, Lion: these impenetrable male 
icons brook no quarter, absorb no insult. Figures of imaginary 
wholeness, they are archaic or marginal within the realm of the 
ongoing social—a solution at one level that is a collapse at 
another. Is there any doubt that Lucas reincarnates these figures 
when he silences Roth by saying: “ I’m the man here (GDM 
116)? In my reading. Intruder in the Dust continues this phan- 
tasmatic project, suturing Lucas into a monument of fixed 
manhood, a phallus without the complications of interiority, 
pure, immovable, impervious: imprisoned in the social yet 
unbroken in the imaginary. It is as though, by 1948, the only 
Man Faulkner could envisage among the puling boys and men 
he gazed upon—the only figure beyond social cooptation and 
therefore capable of genuine self-possession—^would have to 
be black, immolated, and unconquerable. I turn to Paul D 
in Beloved.
“Mister, he looked so . . . free. Better than me. Stronger, 
tougher. Son a bitch couldn t even get out the shell by hisself but 
he was still king and I was . . . Paul D stopped and squeezed his 
left hand with his right. He held it that way long enough for it and 
the world to quiet down and let him go on.
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Mister was allowed to be and stay what he was. But I wasn’t 
allowed to be and stay what I was. Even if you cooked him you’d be 
cooking a rooster named Mister. But wasn’t no way I’d ever be Paul 
D again, living or dead. Schoolteacher changed me. I was some­
thing else and that something was less than a chicken sitting in the 
sun on a tub.” (B 72)
Like Faulkner’s totem animals that radiate an imaginary 
integrity, Mister impresses Paul D as immovably centered, and 
therefore free. Even eaten. Mister stays what he is, remains 
intact, a feat beyond Paul D’s capacity. Paul D has lost his 
proper, his own; owned and invaded by Schoolteacher, he has 
been remade into a being he can no longer subjectify as himself 
Why has his identity project failed and how does Morrison 
propose its recovery?
We begin again with names. Garner named them all, bestow­
ing both their names and their manhood. Others’ slaves were 
treated as boys; Gamer’s were trained as men:
Beg to differ. Gamer. Ain’t no nigger men.”
“Not if you scared, they ain’t.” Garner’s smile was wide. “But if 
you a man yourself, you’ll want your niggers to be men too.”
I wouldn’t have no nigger men around my wife. ”
It was the reaction Gamer loved and waited for. “Neither would 
I, he said. Neither would I,” and there was always a pause before 
the neighbor . . . got the meaning. Then a fierce argument, 
sometimes a fight, and Garner came home bruised and pleased, 
having demonstrated one more time what a real Kentuckian was: 
one tough enough and smart enough to make and call his own 
niggers men. (B 11)
Gamer performs exactly the definition of manhood he pretends 
to offer his slaves: the maintenance of physical integrity, the 
capacity to make good on your word, to prove it through bodily 
prowess. White manhood is the maintaining of self-possession, 
the adequation of one’s behavior to one’s will, the ability to 
patrol one’s property—one’s self at all times, one’s wife in this 
instance—and guarantee that she remains one’s own. The fights 
break out over just this, the other men’s realization that Garner 
has insulted their capacity to patrol their wives in the presence
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of nigger men, not boys. A “real Kentuckian” looks remarkably 
like Old Carothers; he makes people do his bidding, assigns 
their names and object-status in relation to his subject-control, 
remains inalterably himself
Paul D’s crisis stems from his having been trained to believe 
himself such a man.^® Choices had been made available to him, 
he was never forced. Rather, he had subjectified the proffered 
model, assented to the hailing, imagined himself in charge of 
himself. Only later, after Morrison has exposed him to the full 
brunt of slavery, does Paul D see that on this model he can 
never be a man: the black experience of slavery simply disallows 
the equation of male identity with male will. In Genovese s 
words, “The slaveholders deprived black men of the role of 
provider; refused to dignify their marriages or legitimize their 
issue; compelled them to submit to physical abuse in the 
presence of their women and children; made them choose 
between remaining silent while their wives and daughters were 
raped or seduced and risking death. The list continues. Paul 
D’s experience of such impotence is harrowing.
The text produces him as a man invaded, treated like an 
abusable woman. Things are put into male slaves: a bit in their 
mouths, a penis in their mouths, irons upon their legs. If 
manhood means self-ownership, Paul D is owned by others, 
raped repeatedly. He ceases to be a single entity: his body 
shakes uncontrollably (as Temple Drake’s does after her rape in 
Sanctuary). He becomes a site of overrun boundaries: “Paul D 
thought he was screaming; his mouth was open and there was 
this loud throat-splitting sound—but it may have been some­
body else. Then he thought he was crying. Something was 
running down his cheeks. He lifted his hands to wipe away the 
tears and saw dark brown slime” (B 110). Liquids pour out of 
him, over him, into him; his own, those of others, those of 
nature. Out of control, venting without knowing it just as 
Sethe’s urine breaks without her consent, Paul D undergoes a 
self-undoing that grotesquely reverses the Oedipal crisis. Rather 
than struggle with taboo desires and succeed in imposing a
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boundary upon them—a boundary enabling eventual entry into 
language, individuation, manhood, paternity, and property— 
Paul D reverts, under such pressure, to a chaotic, prehuman 
economy of liquids. At the extreme, when a male slave is 
confronted with the utter incapacity of his will to affect his 
reality, forced to watch impotently while his wife is beaten and 
milked, he becomes—like Halle—simultaneously not-male and 
insane (his identity no longer his own), a creature smeared in 
butter, undone by a liquid economy erasing all boundaries, 
disfiguring a face and a mind once male.
This critique of the Oedipal seems as profoundly Morrison’s 
intention as the re-imagining of the Oedipal seems Faulkner’s. 
As the grounding norm of white society, the Oedipal stabilizes 
patriarchy itself^® It does so by providing Western culture’s 
central paradigm for justifying the male child’s endurance of 
(rather than rebellion against) libidinal repression imposed by 
authority: justified because in time that child will achieve the 
individuation of centered selfhood, will take on the structural 
position of the vacated father, and will inherit his authority and 
his possessions. To become properly oneself, to move from 
infantile polymorphous perversity to adult conventionality, is to 
discipline desire and to enter the genealogical field of property- 
descent. Morrison shows that this gender economy—geared to 
the patriarchal notions of propriety, property, and the proper— 
must be reconceived if it is to nourish disenfranchised black 
subjectivity. Beloved contributes in a number of ways to just 
such a reconception.
There is, first, the tension between loving small and loving 
large. Morrison’s commitment to the Margaret Garner materials 
radiates from a slave woman’s refusal to love small. A sentimen­
tal writer would have exonerated such large love, a lesser writer 
would have criticized it: Morrison explores both its cost and its 
necessity. She shows that for black slaves to love large is to 
enact an identification that risks insanity when the loved ones 
are abused: “He saw a witless coloredwoman jailed and hanged 
for stealing ducks she believed were her own babies” {B 66). At
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the same time Morrison shows us that Paul D’s heart cannot be 
confined within that rusted tin can. So long as he believes this, 
Paul D is on the run, unwilling to invest his feelings where he 
cannot, manlike, maintain his will. Indeed, his initial indictment 
of Sethe—“You got two feet, Sethe, not four” {B 165)—follows 
from a sense of manhood in which the proper still reigns: her 
behavior is hers to patrol, there is a right and a wrong choice, 
she has made the wrong one.
Our judicial system is founded in certain ways on such 
distinctions; its notions of right and wrong are largely calibrated 
according to the male criterion of self-responsibility before the 
law. We are assumed individually responsible for patrolling our 
territory, maintaining our proper/property. Beloved recurrently 
undermines this model, perhaps most eloquently in those in­
tense passages in part 2 where we cannot responsibly assign 
utterance to speaker, say what belongs to whom. This collapse 
of boundaries is writ with equal power in Sethe’s act itself— 
“This here new Sethe didn’t know where the world stopped and 
she began” (B 164)—an act in which self and world are inextrica­
bly intertwined. The murder of the child explodes the bound­
aries without which there can be no proper itself: it is her act 
and yet not hers, her fault and yet not her fault. The weight of 
an entire institution—the institution of slavery—must be 
brought to bear, if we would understand how a mother might 
kill a child out of love and be both right and wrong in doing so. 
If the law is useless for sorting this out, if the law incites to 
violence rather than to self-possession, if the law proposes no 
credible paternal model for normative behavior, how is Oedipus 
to oversee our maturation by laying down and legitimizing our 
categories of gender difference? Paul D eventually comes to 
see—in washing Sethe’s feet rather than counting them, in 
nursing rather than judging—that male and female are massively 
interdependent realms, and that a black man cannot sustain a 
model of white manhood. As Hortense Spillers puts it, the 
black American male embodies the only American community 
of males which has had the specific occasion to learn who the
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female is within itself. This female-within-male calls into 
question gender categories in ways that go beyond the ken of all 
impenetrable Misters.
* * *
I would close speculatively. Both writers know—how could they 
not?—that the central damage done by slavery to black manhood 
was to cripple individual agency. Unable to equate self with 
will, black men were wounded in their own proper, their 
capacity to own themselves, to become full-fledged Misters. “A 
man without force,” Frederick Douglass had written as early as 
1855, “is without the essential dignity of humanity. Human 
nature is so constituted that it cannot honor a helpless man, 
although it can pity him; and even that it cannot do long, if the 
signs of power do not arise.^^gj^ impotence 
to the pride that sustains identity fuels Faulkner’s intricate 
exploration of Lucas Beauchamp and accounts for Intruder in 
the Dust’s suturing of Lucas’s authority. Morrison, by contrast, 
does not so much restore Paul D’s manhood as reconceive it. 
The reconception calls into question the Oedipal economy of 
the achieved proper itself
In her work—especially her theoretical work—^we find, fore­
grounded, what we may be learning to recognize in Faulkner’s 
as well (though against the grain), that identity of every sort is 
differential rather than “properly” achieved. Self-owning is 
rarely innocent. Men too often know who they are, they ratify 
their self-image, through repudiating the other: they are not 
women, they are not blacks. “I aint a nigger,” little Jason says 
in That Evening Sun. In this casual paradigm we see the 
fantasy of a pure identity being constituted by a juxtaposition 
against contaminating others. Morrison powerfully explicates 
the drama, acted out in countless scenes in American history, in 
which the meaning of white freedom requires for its salient 
unfolding an immovable black silhouette. I quote from Playing 
in the Dark:
The need to establish difference stemmed not only from the Old
World but from a difference in the New. What was distinctive in
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the New was, first of all, its claim to freedom and, second, the 
presence of the unffee within the heart of the democratic experi­
ment—the critical absence of democracy, its echo, shadow, and 
silent force in the political and intellectual activity of some not- 
Americans. The distinguishing features of the not-Americans were 
their slave status, their social status—and their color.
It is conceivable that the first would have self-destructed in a 
variety of ways had it not been for the last. These slaves, unlike 
many others in the world’s history, were visible to a fault. And they 
had inherited, among other things, a long history on the meaning of 
color. It was not simply that this slave population had a distinctive 
color; it was that this color “meant” something. That meaning had 
been named and deployed by scholars from at least the moment, in 
the eighteenth century, when other and sometimes the same schol­
ars started to investigate both the natural history and the inalienable 
rights of man—that is to say, human freedom.^
Here we return to Locke and the Enlightenment with a 
darker awareness that freedom and unfreedom, like male and 
female, white and black, are inextricably interdependent 
terms—that selfhood as achieved property plays itself out differ­
entially, against a backdrop of dispossession. “Before slavery,” 
Orlando Patterson argues, “people simply could not have con­
ceived of the thing we call freedom.”^ Surely it is because 
Faulkner’s characters so yearn for self-sufficiency that his texts 
dramatize their discovery of internal rupture—their incapacity 
to maintain identity as a self-patrolled property—as a tragic 
burden. To be rudely ejected from the sanctuary of one’s 
imaginary self-possession is to be involuntarily invaded by oth­
ers, to be othered:
But after that I seemed to see them [black people] for the first time 
not as people, but as a thing, a shadow in which I lived, we lived, 
all white people, all other people. I thought of all the children 
coming forever and ever into the world, white, with the black 
shadow already falling upon them before they drew breath. And I 
seemed to see the black shadow in the shape of a cross. And it 
seemed like the white babies were struggling, even before they 
drew breath, to escape from the shadow that was not only upon 
them but beneath them too, flung out like their arms were flung 
out, as if they were nailed to the cross. I saw all the little babies
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that would ever be in the world, the ones not yet even born—a long 
line of them with their arms spread, on the black crosses.^
The speaker is Joanna in Light in August, but the burden she 
carries here is more generally Faulknerian. It is the awareness 
that those of us who are white are both orphaned and multiply 
possessed, both abandoned and penetrated by our parents and 
by the larger culture’s unwanted arrangements. Women not 
only show men that they are, satisfyingly, men, but women also 
live within men uninvited, disturbing the propriety of male 
norms. And blacks, because of what those of us who are white 
did to them in the South before we were even born, will forever 
live inside us, owed a reparation beyond our capacity to repress 
or repay. Insofar as the property model of identity may never­
theless operate in Faulkner’s work—requiring the other’s disen­
franchisement to know itself as free—it does so outside the 
comforts of innocence, in the form of an overdetermined and 
internalized debt, an accumulating cultural mortgage—a prop­
erty with insurmountable liens upon it—one of those checks we 
somehow co-signed before exiting from our mother’s womb and 
which will be called in for cashing any day now.
Morrison, by contrast, seems to register the penetrability of 
identity as both burden and promise. Whites may know them­
selves as not-black, yes, but her best work goes past this 
oppositional frame, opening into a complex embrace of the 
mutuality that funds all identity.Identity as patrolled property 
too easily slips into figurative ossification of self or literal en­
slavement of others. Beloved shows, instead, the irresistible 
need to live in others, to know self through identificatory 
investment in others. You could be reduced to insanity by the 
damage done to your loved ones, but you could also survive 
disaster by identifying—as Sethe does in her flight to freedom— 
with those beings who came from your body but who are not 
you. They call to that in you that exceeds you, that is not your 
property to patrol. Sethe’s breasts are not her own; they and 
the milk they carry link her to her ofispring. The text’s most
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terrifying image is of white boys enclosing those breasts as their 
own property. What is for Faulkner our human tragedy—that 
we are never our own, are always trying to say, always inade­
quate to and in excess of ourselves—is for Morrison our human 
possibility.
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